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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FOULGER EQUIPMENT CO·MP ANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE T A X COMMISSION 0 F 
UTAH and O·RVILLE GUNTHER, 
DONALD T. ADAMS, ARIAS G. BEL-
NAP, and AL·LAN M. LIPMAN consti-
tuting the members of said commission, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
10222 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an original proceeding in the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah for an extraordinary \vrit in 
the nature of mandamus requiring the respondent StatP 
Tax Commission to prescribe and promulgate rules and 
regulations under which an exemption for ad valore1n 
property tax may be clailned. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus requiring the 
respondents to issue rules and regulations as required 
by Section 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The 1963 Utah Legislature enacted Substitute Sen-
ate Bill 27, providing for what is commonly known as 
"freeport" exemption. The bill, which became effective 
sixty days after the close of the 1963 legislative session 
on May 14, 1963, provided as follows: 
"S·ection 1. Situs of Tangible Personal Prop-
erty. 
"Tangible personal property being held for 
sale or processing and which is present in Utah 
on January 1, m., whether manufactured, process-
ed, produced or otherwise originating within or 
without the state, which is shipped to final destin-
ation outside this state within twelve months 
following is deemed to have acquired no situs 
in Utah for ad valorem property tax purposes 
and shall be exempt." See Section 59-2-14, U.C.A. 
1953. 
Section 2 of the Bill, now kno\vn as Section 59-2-15, 
U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"·The Utah State Tax Commission shall pre-
scribe rules and regulations under which the fore-
going exemption may be claimed and applied." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The Foulger Equipment Company is a corporation 
organized under the laws of Utah and authorized to do 
business in this state, and in fact doing business at 
1361 South Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
~The company is engaged in retail sales and distribu-
tion of items of tangible personal property which are 
sold out of the State of Utah after periods not exceeding 
2 
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twelve months prior to the shipment to the place of 
sale. Such tangible personal property consists of in-
dustrial equipment and machinery, and in previous years 
petitioner has reported and paid ad valorem taxes on 
said property in its possession as of January 1st of any 
given year. On August 10, 1964, the company petitioned 
the State Tax Commission for promulgation of regula-
tions under which it might claim the said exemption as 
of January 1, 1965. Petitioner is now entitled to an 
exemption from ad valorem taxation of such property 
under the express terms of Substitute Senate Bill No. 27, 
codified as Section 59-2-14, and intends to claim such 
exemption on January 1, 1965. The Tax Commission 
has indicated to the company that it will not prescribe 
such rules and regulations and that it has advised the 
Salt Lake County Assessor not to grant said exemption. 
It is imperative that such rules and regulations be form-
ulated and distributed to the local tax assessors without 
further delay in order that the petitioner and others 
similarly situated might be able to claim the exemption 
in question, and the Tax Commission has indicated that 
such regulations 'vill not be forthco1ning even should 
the people of this state ratify and adopt the amendment 
authorized by Senate Joint Resolution No. 5 at the 
November, 1964 elections. 
The 1963 Legislature further provided for the sub-
mission of a constitutional amendment to amend ArticlP 
XIII, Section 2, of the Utah ·Constitution to provide 
permissive authority to the -utah Legislature to exempt 
tangible personal property from ad valorein taxation 
in this state. Regardless of whether or not this amend-
3 
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ment is passed, the petitioner herein has a present right 
to the regulations prayed for. 
The State T:ax Commission, on the 18th day of Au-
gust, 1964, issued its decision wherein it denied the peti-
tioner the right to rules and regulations under which 
the exemption in question can be claimed, and as no other 
adequate legal remedy is available to petitioner, it now 
seeks an extraordinary writ in the nature of mandamus 
to compel the State Tax Commission to comply with its 
statutory obligation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN AND ADEQUATE LEGAL 
REMEDY T'HROUGH WHICH THE PETITIONER CAN OB-
TAIN T'HE RELIEF HEREIN PRAYED. 
S·ection 59-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, in effect May 14, 1963, 
requires the Utah State ·Tax Commission to prescribe 
rules and regulations under which the exemption pro-
vided by Section 59-2-14, U.·c·.A. 1953, can be claimed. 
The Tax Commission refused and continues to refuse 
to perform this statutory obligation. Petitioner and 
others similary situated will be caused irreparable dam-
age and deprived of certain statutory rights unless the 
Tax Commission is compelled to promptly promulgate 
regulations as required under this section. 
No other court in the State of Utah has jurisdiction 
or authority to compel the State Tax Con1n1ission to 
comply with its statutory obligation. 
4 
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It has been held that 'vhere high rights, prerogatives 
and franchises of a state are involved, as disti)lguished 
from private rights, that a lower court may not have 
jurisdiction to require a state agency to perform an act. 
People ex rel. Greaves v. District Court, 37 Colo. 443, 
86 Pac. 87, 92 Pac. 958. 
It has been held that appellate courts of last resort 
are granted original jurisdiction over executive and ad-
ministrative officers, and that in the exercise of this 
jurisdiction they may issue writs of mandamus. 34 Am. 
Jur., Ma~damus, Sec. 21. 
A declaratory judgment proceeding is not available 
to petitioner and would not adequately provide for the 
relief prayed for which is necessary in order that 
petitioner may claim the exemption in question. It has 
been held that courts will not pass upon the constitution-
ality of a legislative act by means of a declaratory judg-
ment where it does not appear that any attempt has been 
made to enforce the act, since "for them to declare invalid 
an unenforced statute would be equivalent to passing a 
mere abstraction." 87 A.L.R. 1233; 16 Am. Jur., Declara-
tory Judgments, Sec. 28. 
It has been further held that where a declaratory 
judgment act only empowers a court to declare rights, 
status, and other legal relations, it does not empower a 
court to give directions in the nature of mandates. 16 
Am. Jur., D·eclaratory Judgments, Sec. 49; 87 A.L.R. 
1240. 
As the taxpaye-r herein is totally dependent upon 
the ·Tax Commission's action in order to be able to 
5 
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claim the exen1ption, and as the Tax Com1nission has 
indicated that it will not act, it is therefore necessary 
that the Court issue the writ prayed for in order to 
safeguard and preserve the rights granted to petitioner 
by Section 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953. 
POINT II. 
THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO· AN EXEMPTION 
UNDER SE;CTION 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953. 
The Tax Commission seeks to avoid granting the 
exemption claimed by petitioner and to further avoid 
promulgating rules and regulations as required by Sec-
tion 59-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, on the grounds that Section 
59-2-14, U.'C.A. 1953, is unconstitutional. 
It is generally held that a public officer does not 
have a sufficient interest in a statute to entitle him to 
question the constitutionality thereof and to refuse to 
comply with its provisions. See Columbia q G. R. Co. 
v. Miller, 238 U.S. 96, S.Ct. 392, 75 L. Ed. 861; People 
ex rel. State Boa.r.d of Equalization v. Pitcher, 61 Colo. 
149, 156 Pac. Pac. 812; Fulton Foundation v. Wisconsin 
Dept. of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312. To 
allow the State Tax Commission of Utah to arbitrarily 
disregard the requirements of a statute which it deems 
to be invalid is to pron1ote a govern1nent of men, not 
laws, and further to provoke anarchy and confusion. The 
State Tax ~c·ommission should be bound by the require-
Inents of law like any other citizen of the State of lTtah 
and cannot disregard la,vs \vith \vhich it does not agree. 
6 
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Section 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953, clearly provides that 
intangible personal property being held for sale or 
processing which is present in Utah on January 1, m., 
and which is shipped to final destination outside the 
state within twelve months following is deemed to have 
acquired no situs in Utah for tax purposes and is exempt. 
There has been no showing that petitioner does not fully 
qualify for the exemption as set forth in the Utah stat-
utes; indeed, the stipulation signed by the Tax Com-
mission officials is clearly to the effect that petitioner 
does qualify. There is, however, no administrative ma-
chinery available at the county level whereby this exemp-
tion can be claimed, the burden for prescribing such 
rules and regulations being on the Utah Stahl 
Commission by virtue of Section 59-2-15, U.C.A. 1953. 
The Tax Commission's failure to act is depriving the 
petitioner of a statutory right to tax exemption, and as 
such, its illegal and unauthorized actions cannot deprive 
the petitioner of an exemption to which it is entitled by 
law. 
POINT III. 
SECTION 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953, IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah provides in part: 
"All tangible property in this state, not ex-
empt under the laws of the United States, or 
this Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to 
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law ... " 
The Legislature of the State of Utah, by Pnacting 
Section 59-2-14, has expressly 1no;dified the 1:nterstate 
7 
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commerce clause of the []nited States Constitution by 
determining that certain types of property 'vill be 
deemed to have acquired not situs in Utah for property 
tax purposes. The properties in question are those 
shipped to a final destinaton outside the State of Utah 
wthin twelve months following the tax date. The State 
Tax ·Commission cannot limit property in interstate 
commerce by determining that the Utah Legislature has 
exceeded its authority in exempting property 'vithout a 
constitutional amendment. 
It has been held that where t'vo possible construc-
tions are available to a statute that the court 'vill be 
bound to grant effect to that construction which will up-
hold the statute's constitutionality. Therefore, if it is 
possible to construe Section 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953, to 
uphold its constitutionality, then the court is bound to 
do so and should not hold the statute to be void and un-
constitutional unless it is clearly sho,vn that the statute 
is, in fact, violative of the Constitution. 
The Federal Constitution requires that Congress 
shall have power "to regulate commerce ",.ith foreign 
nations, and among the several states and ",.ith the Indian 
tribes." U.S. Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8. This Con-
stitution and the laws and treaties 1nade in regard there-
to are supreme over all the states, and any exercise of 
state power, whether by taxation or otherwise, in conflict 
there"\\rith is void. 
As the only exe1nption in question is one allotted 
to propPrty 'vhich is held in Utah for sale out of the State 
0 
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of Utah, and the legislature, as such, has defined such 
holding and sale as an interstate sale by detern1ining that 
such property does not have situs in Utah, the property 
is exempt by virtue of the commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, regardless of what Article XIII, Section 2, 
of the Utah Constitution may say. As such property is 
exempt by virtue of its not having situs within this state, 
it is impossible that such exemption can violate Article 
XIII, Section 2, 'vhich only relates to property 'vithin 
the state. 
POINT IV. 
SE,CTION 59-2-14, U .. C.A. 1953, IS NOT UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL BE·CAUSE IT WAS PASSED IN ANTICIPATION 
OF THE ENACTMEN'T O·F A CONSTITUTIONAL AMEND-
MENT RATIFYING OR CONFIRMING THE STATUTE. 
Generally, a legislature has power to enact a statute 
not authorized by an existing constitution where the 
statute is passed in anticipation of the constitutional 
amendment which will authorize it. In the case of Dr1tg-
gan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36, 46 S.Ct. 14, 70 I.Ed. 151, 
the petitioner was imprisoned for contempt in disobeying 
a temporary injunction issued under the National Prohi-
bition Act. The bill upon which the injunction was issued 
alleged the existence of a public nuisance for the rnanu-
facture of intoxicating liquor and charged that the peti-
tioner, among others, was conducting such a busjne~H. 
The petitioner was committed to jail, whereupon he filed 
a petition for a writ of habeus corpus. The 1na:in ground 
for the petition was that Title 2 of the act was unconsti-
tutional because it was enacted before Amendinent Eight-
een of the Constitution went into effect. The United 
9 
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States Supreme Court, through ~fr. Justice llolmes, 
stated in regard to this argument that the moment an 
amendment to the Federal Constitution was ratified it 
became effective as la\v, and that therefore the National 
Prohibition Act, which 'vas enacted after the ratification 
of the Eighteenth Amendn1ent to the Constitution was 
not invalid because the time when the prohibitory pro-
visions of that amendment became effective. The Court 
there said: 
"It would be going far to say that while the 
fate of the amendment was uncertain, Congress 
could not have passed a la"r in aid of it, condi-
tioned upon the ratification taking place." Ibid, 
p. 39. 
In any event the Tax Commission of Utah has no 
power to hold the statute in question unconstiutional. In 
the case of Engineers Public Service Co. v. SEC., 9 
S.E.C. 764, '768 (1941), the administrative agency in 
question held: 
"It is well established that an administrative 
body such as this con1mission has no authority 
to pass on the constituionality of an act "'"hich it 
is called upon to administer." 
The reviewing court in the same case agreed. Engineers 
Public Scrrice Co. v. S.E.C., 78 lT.S. App. D.C. 199, 
138 F .2d 936, 952, 953 ( 19-!3), dismissed as moot 332 
U.S. 788, 68 S.Ct. 96, 92 L.Ed. 370. See also Panitz v. 
District of Columbia, 72 App. D.C. 131, 112 F.2d 39 
(1940); Todd v. S.E.C., 137 F.:2d ±75, (6th Cir. 1943); 
Central f..T ebraska Public Power <S~ I rrig. District v. 
1() 
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F.P.C., 160 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1947) cert. den. 3.32 U.S. 
765, 68 S.Ct. 762, 9'2 L.Ed. 351. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no plain and adequate legal remedy through 
which petitioner may obtain the relief sought. Since 
the Tax Commission has denied petitioner's demand for 
promulgation of rules and regulations as required by 
Section 59-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, the petition for an extra-
ordinary 'vrit in the nature of mandamus is properly 
before this court. No other forum may have authority 
to require the State Tax Commission to prescribe these 
rules and regulations. Failure of the Commission to 
comply with the statutory charge in this regard will 
result in petitioner and others like situated being unable 
to claim the exemption they are entitled to by law, to 
their damage. Petitioner's operation and manner of 
doing business clearly qualify it for an exemption under 
the provisions of Section 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953. 
This section is valid and not in conflict with the 
Constitution of either the United States of Arne rica or 
the State of Utah, inasmuch as the property on which 
the exemption will lie is defined by the legislature aH 
being in interstate commerce. Even if this court deter-
mined that respondent's contention in relation to the 
to the unconstitutionality of the bill at this tin1e hP 
upheld, petitioner respectfully submits that this defect 
will be cured by the passage in November by the elector-
ate of this state of the proposed amendment to Article 
XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution. 
11 
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p·etitioner further submits that the Tax Commission 
has acted arbitrarily and in excess of its authority in 
purporting under any circumstances to pass upon the 
constitutionality of a valid legislative enactment. 
We thus respectfully urge this honorable court to 
grant the extraordinary writ in the nature of mandamus 
herein sought. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WjjLLIAM C. BAILEY 
150 South S-ixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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